*Changes have been underlined*



the Plaintiff, Gordon Smith, pro se, for his claim against the Defendants,

Delaware State Police, unknown employees of the Delaware State Police, Detective Stephen

Fausey, individually and in his official capacity, Trooper Justin Galloway, Trooper William Miller,

individually and in his official capacity, Guy Sapp as Administrator of the Delaware Family Court,

Unknown employee(s) of the Kent County Family Court, individually and in their official

capacity, Carl Danberg, as Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Corrections, Dover

Police Department, Capitol Police Department, Corporal Ricardo Lucas, individually and in his

official capacity, and alleges and states as follows:

1) That on or about January 25, 2009, Plaintiff Smith, hereinafter Smith or Plaintiff, was falsely

accused of a crime.

2) Plaintiff was arrested by defendant Dover Police Dept, hereinafter Dover PD, on warrant and

served an ex-parte Protection from Abuse Order, that included order for Relief that the Petitioner

could have “use” of the vehicle owned by and in the care custody and control of Plaintiff.

3) Defendant Dover PD took possession of Plaintiff’s 2008 Dodge Caliber and failed to let

Plaintiff remove his personal property.

4)That on or about January 12, 2010, the Plaintiff sought a Protection from Abuse Order against

his now former wife. Said Petition was scheduled for hearing for both parties to be present at a

subsequent date.

5)That on or about January 12, 2010, Defendant unknown employee(s) of the Kent County

Family Court spoke to Plaintiff’s ex-wife advising her that Plaintiff had, that day, filed for a PFA

and advising her to cross file.

6) On January 12, 2010, Plaintiff, lawfully, having obtained the proper permit, demonstrated

outside Kent County Family Court, with another individual, holding signs and passing out leaflets,

that were derisive of family court and alleging that their PFA process discriminated against men.

7) That on or about January 12, 2010, Plaintiff’s ex-wife, went to Kent County Family Court, as

so advised by FC employee, and filed a PFA Petition and it was granted ex-parte.

8) On the evening of January 12, 2010, Plaintiff spoke at a public hearing of the Delaware Family

Law Commission regarding the injustice he experienced in family court in the proceeding months.

9) That Defendant unknown employee(s) of Defendant Kent County Family Court (FC)

wrongfully entered Plaintiff Smith into the protection order information system, CIJIS, part of

DELJIS available to law enforcement and other unknown individuals in official capacity, as having

been served the ex-parte order of protection on or about midnight on January 13, 2010; when in

fact he had not been served the ex-parte PFA.

10) That on or about January 13, 2010, Plaintiff’s ex-wife contacted the DSP, in the evening and

made a report that the Plaintiff had called her cell phone at approximately 10:51 AM and left a

message and called the land line where she was living, between 5 and 6 PM and left a message for

his minor children in violation of the ex-parte PFA.


11) That DSP Officer, Adrienne Owen, listened to a voice mail and answering machine message

and believed the voice to be that of the Plaintiff, despite not knowing the Plaintiff or having

spoken to the Plaintiff or being able to personally identify his voice.

12) That the DSP alleged the officer verified, on the computer system, that Plaintiff had been

served the ex-parte PFA, midnight of January 13, 2010 and had thus been given lawful notice.

13) That Plaintiff had not been served the ex-parte PFA at midnight on January 13 or at anytime

otherwise to that point.

14) Plaintiff was falsely arrested, on the warrant, on January 14, 2010, at approximately 1 PM by

Dover PD.

15) Plaintiff was taken into custody by Dover PD and then transferred to the custody of DSP who

transported him to Troop 3.

16) During his detainment at Troop 3, Plaintiff was confined to a small room. He told Defendant

Galloway that he was claustrophobic and Defendant Galloway laughed and stated ‘you think

that’s bad just wait until you get to Vaughn’

17) Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that he would be released on unsecured bond on the

charge of criminal contempt of a PFA and also knew that the woman who had been with him,

when he was arrested, would pay his bond if any required, and questioned in his mind why

Defendant Galloway would make that remark.

18) That Plaintiff told JP Wood, an employee of the Delaware Justice of the Peace Court,

(hereinafter JOP) during the video arraignment, that he had not been served an ex-parte PFA and

that he had not contacted the Petitioner of the PFA.

19) That JP Wood, during the video arraignment, left and allegedly verified that there was a valid

PFA, that an order granting a PFA that had been legally served on the Plaintiff at midnight on

January 13, 2010.

20) JP Wood set at bail of $1,000 secured.

21) That allegedly, according to FC employee; unspecified employee(s) of Defendant Family

Court became aware of Plaintiff’s false and wrongful arrest at an unknown time of the afternoon

of January 14, 2010 and attempted remedial action to have Plaintiff released and warrant recalled.


22) An associate of Plaintiff’s was personally at Troop 3 when bail was set at $1,000 secured and

informed DSP that bond would be paid and asked how long Plaintiff would be held at Troop 3

23) DSP told the associate of the Plaintiff that he would be held until 5PM before being

transferred to prison.

24) This associate of the Plaintiff, who had been sent there to pick him up when he was released,

contacted Plaintiff’s friend, at whose request he had gone to Troop 3 and told her a secured bail

had been set and that according to DSP she had until 5PM to have the money at Troop 3.

25) In reliance on the statement by DSP, in the previous paragraph, a bail bondsman was

contacted and agreed to meet Plaintiff’s friend at Troop 3 to pay $1,000 cash bail.

26) That allegedly unspecified employees of Defendant Family Court, aware that Plaintiff had

been arrested by DSP, contacted Defendant DSP and informed unknown employees at Troop 3

that the warrant was bad and Plaintiff had not been served, that he was falsely arrested.

27) That allegedly unspecified employees of Defendant FC, aware that Plaintiff had NOT been

lawfully served the PFA and had been wrongfully entered into DELJIS/CIJIS stayed after close of

business “an hour” until 5:30 PM and took actions to have Plaintiff released from custody.

28) That with the knowledge that the warrant had been obtained for Plaintiff in reliance on the

wrongful statement that he had been served the PFA, that Plaintiff was hence innocent of the

charge for which he had been arrested, Defendant Galloway and unknown employees of

Defendant DSP failed to release Plaintiff.

29) That with the knowledge that the bail bondsman was en-route to pay the bail and secure

Plaintiff’s release Defendant Galloway and unknown employees of Defendant DSP conspired to

further deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights and to transported Plaintiff to the Delaware Correctional

Facility in Smyrna, Delaware prior to 5PM.

30 ) That with the knowledge that Plaintiff was innocent and had been falsely arrested, Defendant

Galloway did in fact, transport Plaintiff to James T. Vaughn Correctional Facility and turned him

over to the custody of Defendant DOC at approximately 17:00 on January 14, 2010

31) That in the presence of the Plaintiff, Defendant Galloway communicated to an unknown

employee of Defendant DOC at transfer to their custody that Plaintiff was a troublemaker and

needed to be taught a lesson.


32) Plaintiff’s bail was paid at 15:30, at JP 7 and entered into the system at approximately 15:45

33) That Plaintiff, then in the custody or Defendant DOC, was subjected to a strip search and

injected with of a foreign substance against his will.

34) It is against Plaintiff’s religious beliefs to inject such foreign substances into his body and he

told that to the DOC staff and that he was being bailed out and would not be there long enough

for the results to come back.

35) DOC forced him to have the injection.

36) Plaintiff told DOC staff that he was a former Probation Officer and had been formerly

employed in loss prevention in Delaware, apprehending shoplifters and members of organized

retail theft rings and participated in their arrest and prosecution and he was afraid for his safety.

37) DOC failed to take any special steps to ensure the safety of Plaintiff, in light of the

information provided to them in the previous paragraph

38) That during his incarceration Plaintiff was left alone with two inmates, without a guard being

present, and one of the inmates threatened Plaintiff and demanded he remove his pants.

39) That Defendant DOC was aware that bail had been paid at approximately 17:45 and failed to

release Plaintiff.

40) That Defendant DOC was made aware that Plaintiff had been wrongfully and falsely arrested

leading to being wrongfully turned over to their custody and false imprisonment no later than 8

AM, the next day, January 15, 2010 by Defendant Family Court, hereinafter FC, and failed to

immediately release Plaintiff.

41) That Plaintiff was released, from incarceration at approximately 2 PM on January 15, 2010

42) After his release from custody, Plaintiff called Defendant FC and was told to come in and be

served the PFA from January 12, 2010

43) Plaintiff went to Defendant FC and was served the Protection from of Abuse Order on

January 15, 2010 and received an apology from employees of Defendant Family Court for having

been falsely entered into DELJIS and the resulting false arrest and false imprisonment he suffered.

44) That employees of Defendant FC told Plaintiff how they tried to get him released following

the false arrest and continued those efforts until approximately 17:30 on January 14 but had been

told by unknown employees of Defendant DSP that he had been turned over to the custody of

Defendant DOC and Defendant DOC would not release him.


45) Unknown employees of Defendant DSP were untruthful with employees of Defendant FC and

had not turned Plaintiff over to Defendant DOC at the time Defendant FC informed them the

arrest was false.

46) DSP failed to take any action to secure the immediate release of Plaintiff after they knew he

had been wrongfully arrested.

47) That between 9:15 AM and 9:25 AM on or about January 26, 2010, Plaintiff was in the lobby

of the Kent County Family Court under video surveillance, in the presence of numerous court

personnel and citizens.

48) That on or about January 26 2010, Plaintiff’s ex-wife who had been granted an ex-parte PFA,

served on Plaintiff Smith, by Family Court August 14, 2010, made an offhand remark in the

presence of Defendant Ricardo Lucas, an employee of the Capitol Police, that Plaintiff had placed

a telephone call to her cell phone voice mail at a 9:21 AM. that morning

49) That Lucas told Plaintiff’s ex-wife that he had to make a report of that and intimidated her

into making a statement on the record accusing Plaintiff of a call at 9:21AM.

50) That the phone of the ex-wife showed that at 9:21 AM an incoming call was received from

an unidentified number.

51) Lucas did not listen to any voice mail message purportedly left by the Plaintiff, on ex-wife’s

cell phone.

52) That Lucas was among the those at Defendant FC, that were present on the first floor of the

Kent County Family Court, when Plaintiff had entered the building shortly after 9 AM and

observed Plaintiff sign in.

53) That between 9:15 AM and 9:25 AM on January 26, 2010, Plaintiff, in compliance with the

rules of Kent County Family Court, did not have a cellular phone or electronic device in his


54) That Lucas was not in the presence of the Plaintiff’s ex-wife, who had obtained the PFA,

when a phone call was received at 9:21 AM.

55) That Lucas had no way of knowing who had placed the call that he had not witnessed or



56)That Plaintiff’s ex-wife did not want to make a police report regarding the phone call that she

received at 9:21 AM on January 26 from the restricted or unknown phone number.

57) As Plaintiff was waiting for the elevator, on the second floor of the Kent Family Court, Lucas

approached Plaintiff and stated ‘you made a phone call to your wife this morning’. Plaintiff denied

it and Lucas admitted to Plaintiff that he saw him in the lobby around the time of the call.

58) Lucas placed Plaintiff under arrest for a misdemeanor charge of criminal contempt of a PFA,

that he had not witnessed nor yet obtained an arrest warrant for.

59) Plaintiff requested that Lucas review the surveillance tapes of the lobby that morning.

60) Lucas refused and did not conduct an investigation of the allegation that Plaintiff had

committed the crime for which he arrested him.

61) That Lucas had at his immediate disposal the video from that mornings surveillance of the

lobby and could have looked at the video of 9:20-9:22 as part of an investigation and viewed

Plaintiffs action at 9:21 and seen that he did not have a cell phone and was not on lobby phone.

62) After arresting Plaintiff, Lucas placed Plaintiff, in handcuffs in a public area of the lobby of the

Kent Family Court while he obtained an arrest warrant.

63) Plaintiff was placed by Lucas outside a courtroom in full view of passing public for a period

of approximately two hours while he wrote a report and obtained a warrant post arrest.

64) Plaintiff was arraigned and released without posting bail and left the building calling Guy Sapp

on his way home.

65) Subsequently, Guy Sapp Chief Court Administrator of Delaware Family Court, viewed the

video surveillance of Plaintiff at 9:21 AM at the time of the alleged criminal act, and it showed

that Plaintiff was not in possession of or using a telephone at 9:20, 9:21, 9:22.

66) That Mr. Sapp told Plaintiff that he viewed surveillance tape of about an hour during which he

did not see Plaintiff on a cell phone or on the lobby phone available to the public.

67) The time of a restricted or unknown call, indicated on ex-wife’s phone was 9:21 and more

than a minute before or after would not be consistent with the automatic time stamp function of

cellular phones.

68) That on or about April 24, 2010 Priority Mail, postage prepaid containing a legal document, a

Petition for Informa Pauperis, was mailed from Plaintiff Smith to Defendant FC , in Kent County,

that was required to be received on or before April 26.


69) That Defendant FC denied receipt of the document verbally to Plaintiff Smith up to and

including April 27, which was after the deadline for filing the document.

70) That Plaintiff produced a record from the United States Postal Service (hereinafter USPS)

that showed delivery at Kent FC on April 25, which was prior to the deadline.

71) That Defendant FC traced the lost Priority Mail envelope to the point that it had been put into

a mail slot, in the Kent County Family Court building, for interdepartmental delivery.

72) That the distinctive Priority Mail Envelope was never located and presumed lost or destroyed.

73) On or about July 16, 2010, Plaintiff’s ex-wife called DSP and reported that Plaintiff had made

a non-threatening phone call.

74) There was no PFA or other lawful order at the time forbidding contact and Plaintiff had called

his ex-wife on this occasion to share with her an experience he had, where he was in Richmond,


75) DSP obtained a warrant for phone harassment, on or about July 16, 2010, based on the

previous paragraph and called Plaintiff and so advised him.

76) At some point, during these events, Defendant Fausey instructed Plaintiff’s ex-wife, custodial

parent of his two minor children not to let Plaintiff have contact with his two sons.

77) Plaintiff’s sons were three and four and even when there is a PFA granted for his ex-wife, the

family court has allowed for provision that Plaintiff be allowed to communicate with his ex-wife

to arrange to see his boys, talk to them on the phone and discuss issues related to them.

78) That Plaintiff subsequently learned that it was alleged that he made “numerous calls and text

messages” which was false, unsubstantiated and never investigated.

79) Plaintiff’s ex-wife told him since that she never told DSP that he had made numerous calls and


80) Plaintiff’s ex-wife was advised by DSP to get a PFA after they obtained the warrant on July

16 and Defendant Fausey told the ex-wife that Plaintiff was a suspect in an attempted assault on

her that he had investigated. He told her not to have contact with the Plaintiff until DNA test

results were in. Fausey, DSP never asked Plaintiff for a DNA sample.

81) Based on what Fausey told Plaintiff’s ex-wife she made false and misleading statements in a

Petition for a PFA on or about July 19, 2010, and an ex-parte PFA was granted against the

Plaintiff, who complainant and DSP knew was no longer in Delaware and could not be a threat of

immediate danger from hundreds of miles away, as required for granting an ex-parte Petition.


82) Plaintiff was not in Delaware and not aware of the ex-parte proceedings.

83) That on or about July 23, 2010 a note was allegedly left at the residence of the Plaintiff’s ex

wife that was threatening.

84) That Fausey told Plaintiff’s ex-wife that he believed Plaintiff was responsible for the note,

which allegedly stated retaliation for the PFA order in previous paragraph.

85) Plaintiff still was unaware of the existence of an ex-parte PFA against him.

86) Fausey, nor any DSP, ever contacted Plaintiff to investigate if in fact he did or could have left

this note and never requested a handwriting sample.

87) That on July 23, 2010 Plaintiff was staying in Virginia and speaking at a public event in

Washington, not in proximity to leave a note at the residence of his ex-wife in Delaware and can

provide numerous witnesses and physical evidence of his whereabouts.

88) Plaintiff’s ex-wife emailed him about the note, at which time he became aware of it. She did

not tell him that he had obtained an ex-parte PFA.

89) That Plaintiff returned to Delaware and went to Troop 3 of Defendant DSP at approximately

1:15 PM on August 9 to be served the July 16 warrant on the charge of harassment by phone

from July 16 and be served the July 19, 2010 ex-parte PFA.

90) That on August 9, 2010, Plaintiff Smith was accused of violating the ex-parte PFA,

of July 19, by his ex-wife, who called DSP at 1:02PM and reported that he was dropped off on

the road in front of her residence by Catherine Gibson, at 12:40. At the time of that call Plaintiff

was on his way in to DSP Troop 3 to be served the July 16 warrant and the PFA.

91) Again DSP failed to investigate the report and obtained a warrant for criminal contempt of a


92) That same evening, August 9, 2010 Plaintiff was arrested on the warrant in the preceding


93) Plaintiff called Catherine Gibson, who was in the lobby of Troop 3, from the back where he

was awaiting video arraignment and told her that he had been arrested and charged with

“watching the boys” at 1PM in violation of the ex-parte PFA.


94) Catherine Gibson, in the lobby of Troop 3, produced signed and time stamped lunch receipts

for Defendant DSP that showed, contrary to the allegation in the report to DSP, she was at a

location in Camden, DE, and informed the Defendant DSP that she and Plaintiff were a significant

distance away from complainant’s children at he time alleged in the police report, eating lunch

with Plaintiff.

95) That Defendant DSP, when the alibi for the charge, the signed time stamped receipt, was

produced failed to release Plaintiff and continued to hold him for video arraignment.

96) DSP questioned Gibson about where Plaintiff was after they had left Troop 3, around 2:20

that day and what color shirt Plaintiff was wearing.

97) Gibson told DSP that Plaintiff was wearing the same green shirt since he showered at 10 that

morning and he was wearing it in the booking photo from 1:30 or so and what he was wearing

still at that time.

98) DSP questioned Plaintiff, separately, about the shirt and where he went after leaving Troop 3

that afternoon.

99) After Plaintiff had left Troop 3 he went to Royal Farms where he was on video surveillance

and then Family Court where he was again on video surveillance.

100) DSP refused to provide Plaintiff with the normal documentation that is given to individuals

when released.

101) Plaintiff called JP Court and asked for copies of the papers and was told they didn’t have

them and to contact the Troop.

102) Plaintiff called Major McQueen and told him that they refused to give him the papers and

suspected that DSP Troop 3 was going to alter the official records.

103) Plaintiff has in his possession now some of the records which show material misstatements

from what actually occurred.

104) That Defendant DSP having seen said physical evidence that Plaintiff Smith was innocent of

the statement in the (false) police report, proceeded with the arrest and arraignment of Plaintiff

Smith and changed the criminal charge from contempt of PFA to breach of release.

105) That said release and no-contact order occurred on August 9, 2010 at approximately



106) The no contact order was made and release was approximately between 2 and 2:18 PM, that

day, August 9, over an hour after the incident allegedly occurred.

107) A no contact order or terms of release are not retroactive but Plaintiff was arraigned and


108) That Plaintiff and his companion Catherine Gibson told the employees of Defendant DSP, at

the time of his arrest on August 9, 2010 that the allegations underlying the criminal charge,

against Plaintiff, were false, that a false police report had been made, that the perpetrator of the

false report had committed a crime, in violation of 11DE1245, against the Plaintiff.

109) Defendant DSP made a concerted effort to alter the series of events to fit the crime.

110) Plaintiff and the other party named in the false report, together and individually demanded

that the perpetrator of the false report be charged with that crime.

111) On or about August 12, 2010 Detective Stephen Fausey, went to Taco Bell/KFC on

Walmart Drive in Camden, DE and in the presence of the store Manager viewed surveillance tape

which showed the Plaintiff was at that restaurant from approximately 12:35 PM through

approximately 1:10 PM thereby further corroborating Plaintiff Smith’s alibi for his whereabouts at

the time his ex-wife alleged that he was within 500 feet of her, in Hartly, DE.

112) That Defendant DSP assigned Defendant Fausey to investigate the crime of false reporting

against Plaintiff.

113) That Plaintiff was called by Defendant Fausey, purportedly to come to Troop 3 to discuss

the crime, false report, committed against him.

114) That Defendant Fausey was, at that interview of the Plaintiff, attempted to fit possible times

that the Plaintiff could have been at the complainants’s residence, exceeding a time frame of four

hours in an effort to fit the evidence to a crime.

115) Plaintiff could provide physical evidence that exculpated him from before 11 AM the day of

the alleged crime, August 9, 2010 to approximately 4 PM.

116) Plaintiff could provide direct evidence accounting for the his whereabouts the entire day of

August 9, 2010 that contradicts any allegation that he was ever on Judith Rd. Hartly, Delaware

that day.


117) Defendant DSP failed to arrest the known perpetrator(s) of the crime against Plaintiff.

118) On or about August 12, 2010 Plaintiff worked a temporary staffing job in Dover

getting out of work at approximately 4PM.

119) Plaintiff called a friend, at his residence in Felton, to come and pick him up, telling her that

he would be walking down the road.

120) Plaintiff’s friend told him that she wanted to stop at Walgreen’s on Forrest Ave and look for

a particular phone card that had been unavailable the Walgreen’s in Woodside and told Plaintiff to

wait for her there.

121) Plaintiff agreed to continue in a southerly direction past that Walgreen’s and meet her at that


122) When Plaintiff arrived at that location he waited outside and when his friend arrived they

went inside where she went across the front and picked out a phone card and went to the register.

123) Plaintiff stayed inside the door, just beyond the metal detectors reading a newspaper waiting

for his friend, who was by then on line at the register, to check out her purchase.

124) Plaintiff’s ex-wife came up an aisle and looked startled to see Plaintiff and his friend. She

was with her boyfriend Bill Merson. The ex-wife, followed by Bill immediately exited the store

passing through the metal detectors.

125) Plaintiff approached his friend who had paid for her purchase and said “Oh my God. Did you

see that? I have to get out of here” and his friend said “wait a minute and give them a chance to

get in their car and go”.

126) Plaintiff and his companion waited and then left the store and got in their car, without seeing

ex-wife again, and drove to Wilmington University.

127) Plaintiff went into Wilmington University with his friend and she had the woman at the desk

fax a document to the New Castle office. The fax was sent at approximately 4:50 PM.

128) Plaintiff called DSP and informed them he had seen the ex at Walgreens and they told him

they didn’t have any report of the incident.

129) The next day, August 13, 2010, Plaintiff learned that Dover PD had a warrant for him.

130) Defendant Dover PD had not contacted him to get his version of the incident or proof of the

time stamped fax that was sent from Wilmington University or contacted the person that was with

him during the incident.


131)Plaintiff contacted Major Nathaniel McQueen, a supervisor with Defendant DSP and told him

that he had learned that Dover PD had a warrant for his arrest based on his seeing the Petitioner

of the PFA when he was at Walgreen’s.

132) Major McQueen told Plaintiff that he would contact Defendant Dover PD and inform their

Deputy Chief that DSP was conducting an investigation into the same complainant for filing a

false police report.

133) Subsequently, Plaintiff learned that Major McQueen had spoken to the Deputy Chief of

Defendant Dover PD and the Deputy Chief left a message for the officer who applied for the

warrant but she was off from work.

134) Cpl. Ranger, Dover PD, had taken a complaint August 12 that alleged that Plaintiff followed

ex-wife to store and followed ex-wife from store.

135) Defendant Dover PD, having the knowledge that complainant was under investigation for

filing a false report failed to recall or void the warrant until the completion of the investigation

that their Deputy Chief said they would conduct.

136) That Plaintiff went to Defendant Dover PD and was arrested not only on the false charge of

criminal contempt but a false charge of felony stalking.

137) JP Sherlock, an employee of the Defendant JP Court, set a bail of $5,500, within the

SENTAC bail guidelines but failing to consider the mitigating circumstances that Officer Richie,

an employee of Defendant Dover PD, proffered to the JP, including the facts that Dover PD was

investigating it as a false report, DSP had an ongoing investigation into the complainant making a

false report and that the Plaintiff had turned himself in.

138) JP Sherlock did not ask Plaintiff for a plea and refused to allow him to speak when Plaintiff

asked if he could address the Court, intending to enter a plea.

139) That the report of criminal contempt of PFA was false and misleading and had Defendant

Dover PD made an investigation prior to obtaining a warrant they would have found information

to contradict the allegations in the police report.

140) That the complainant, who made allegations of crimes by Plaintiff, gave false testimony

under oath in a civil Motion for Contempt of a PFA in Kent County Family Court on or about

August 26, 2010, thereby committing perjury in violation of DE1221-1223.


141) That on August 10, in a hearing at the Kent County Family Court, Plaintiff had produced

copies of the receipts and a statement from the other person named in the police report as his

companion and Ms. Goldberry the clerk at Taco Bell/KFC as physical evidence that he had an

alibi for the crime he had been accused of the previous day, that he was not at the Petitioner’s

residence at 12:40 PM, or 1PM on August 9, as alleged in her statement to DSP and said

evidence was entered into the record as Respondent’s exhibit A.

142) That at the next family court hearing, which was for contempt of PFA, on August 26, 2010

the Petitioner, changed the testimony that she had signed, sworn and given verbally under oath

previously, referenced in paragraph 141, and stated that it was 11:30 that Plaintiff had violated

the PFA, thereby committing perjury DE1223-1225.

143) That employees of DSP including Defendant Fausey had been subpoenaed to testify on

behalf of Plaintiff at the contempt hearing, referenced in the previous paragraph,

paragraph 142, and they were never appeared.

144) As a result of circumstances of the previous paragraph, Plaintiff was not allowed to enter the

Police Report, into evidence, or prove that the time of the alleged violation of the PFA was over

an hour later and Plaintiff was wrongfully found in civil contempt of the PFA.

145) That Petitioner at that hearing on contempt of PFA, stated that it was Defendant Fausey that

though that Plaintiff was responsible for a note purportedly delivered to her residence on July 22

that threatened to kill her and plaintiffs children but Fausey was not present for the Plaintiff to

question because he had ignored the subpoena, an action which constitutes contempt of court.by

Defendant Fausey.

146) Fausey had never questioned the Plaintiff about the note or conducted an investigation as to

the Plaintiff’s whereabouts the day the note was delivered.

147) No employee of Defendant DSP had questioned Plaintiff about the note.

148) That Plaintiff made a complaint to Defendant DSP regarding the fact that Defendant Fausey,

employee failed to comply with a lawful subpoena in violation of the law and policy of the DSP.


149) Defendant Fausey was untruthful when he responded to the complaint and told his superior

Lt. Frahley, that his daughter was sick and he asked for a continuance.

150)When a witness is subpoenaed to appear in Kent County Family Court, they are directed to

contact the Attorney or individual who has subpoenaed them to be excused the clerk is very clear

that she will not grant or excuse a absence on a subpoena.

151) That a follow up complaint to the Captain at Troop 3 against Defendant Fausey regarding

his failure to comply with the subpoena was “substantiated” and unknown “disciplinary action was

taken” according to email from the Troop Captain sent to the Plaintiff..

152) A complaint was made to DSP Internal Affairs, in August 2010 against Defendant Fausey,

regarding his failure to arrest the perpetrator of the crime, false report to the police, against

Plaintiff and nothing has ever come of that or any reply received.

153) Plaintiff has been unable to get jobs befitting his education, training and experience and has

been periodically employed in various temporary positions and low paying dead end jobs.

154) Plaintiff makes $9.00 working a dangerous, unskilled, physically demanding, monotonous

job in a factory.

Paragraphs 155-169 are removed as pertaining to DCSE, no longer a Defendant.

170) That because of the false police reports, subsequent criminal proceedings and the issue of the

derogatory information on the Plaintiff’s background check, enumerated herein, he has been

unemployed and underemployed since he lost his job, as a loss prevention associate, in New

Castle County, following the PFA that resulted in him losing his car.



171) That the Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

172) That Plaintiff Smith was falsely arrested on or about, January 14, 2010, by Delaware State

Police, August 9, 2010 at approximately 1:45PM, August 9, 2010 at approximately 8 PM, by the

Defendant Delaware State Police.


173) DSP did not contact the Plaintiff to have information to determine if he had made the phone

calls alleged and he could have proven that he did not contact the complainant as she alleged.

174) Had DSP investigated by calling Plaintiff, he would have been aware that the computer

system, incorrectly stated that he had been served a PFA. He would have notified FC to correct

their error prior to and without being subject to false arrest.

175) DSP knew Plaintiff had not been served the ex-parte PFA after they were contacted by

Family Court.

176) That the arrest of the Plaintiff on January 14, 2010 was plainly false in that he had not been

served notice of an ex-parte PFA.

177) The charge in the previous paragraph, 176, was expunged by Defendant FC

178) Plaintiff was arrested on a warrant for criminal contempt of PFA, on August 9, 2010 at

which time Defendant Miller was presented with physical evidence that directly contradicted the

verbal, unsupported (by physical evidence), report of a complainant.

179) Defendant DSP knew or should have reasonably have known that reports made by

complainant on August 9, 2010 were false.

180) Defendant Miller questioned the Plaintiff, awaiting video arraignment and the Plaintiff’s

companion, who had provided physical evidence that directly contradicted the original complaint

at 1:02PM, in a reckless disregard for the truth attempting to establish the crime had been

committed after Plaintiff left Troop 3, at about 2:20PM that could be made to fit the charge

despite the complaint to 911 at 1:02PM.

181) Defendant Miller lied in his written statement that he attempted to contact Plaintiff by phone,

at some time after the complaint was received at 1:02PM, as no such call was received or showed

in Plaintiff’s missed call log.

182) The statements made to DSP, reference August 9 warrant in the previous paragraphs, had

inconsistences that were material in the application for a warrant. Complainant variously stated

she was in her car talking to her boyfriend who was at her house, she was in her living room and

looked out window and saw Catherine Gibson and Plaintiff across the street at 12:41PM, out in

the yard with the children when she saw Smith and Gibson, Complainant called DSP at 1:02 and


said she was calling from Food Lion on Rt 8, many miles from her house to report alleged

traumatic incident that allegedly happened less than a half hour prior at the house.

183) The statement to DSP, referenced previous two paragraphs, contained contradictory

statements from the complainant that would make it apparent and obvious to a reasonably trained

officer that the police report was false in violation of 11 Delaware Code 1245.

184) A reasonable and prudent man would have seen a lack of veracity in the inconsistencies in

the statement to DSP and would not have found probable cause {wanton disregard}

185) The falsity of one or the other of two or more statements may be established by proof of

their irreconcilable inconsistency. Such proof is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of falsity.

186) The charge of ““breach of release” on the “release” time stamped 2:18PM Aug. 9, 2010 was

false on its face for an allegation of the crime occurring prior to the issuance of that release.The

call to 911 received at approximately 1:02PM.

187) Defendant Miller misrepresented to the Magistrate the time of the release that Plaintiff was

alleged to have breached and/or the fact the time of the alleged offense or omitted material fact in

order to proceed with the arraignment.

188) Defendant Miller’s actions were gross or wanton negligence or reckless disregard for the


189) The investigation of Defendant DSP, conducted by Defendant Fausey produced additional

physical evidence exculpating Plaintiff of the charges made in the warrant application of August 9,

2010 said investigation should have been conducted prior to application for a warrant.

190) Fausey failed to take police action following the completion of his investigation on complaint

of Plaintiff of a crime against him


191) Plaintiff contacted DSP Internal Affairs, Lt. Wiley and Major McQueen regarding the issue

of repeated false arrests.

192) Major McQueen, of DSP told Plaintiff that complainant “was not going to use DSP”

anymore and that any complaint from his ex-wife, in the future, would have to go up the chain of

command before a warrant application would be made.

193) Plaintiff was arrested on a warrant issued July 16, 2010. Said arrest occurring between

approximately 1:30-1:45PM August 9, 2010.

194) One non- threatening phone call was made to complainant on July 16, 2010 and there was

no PFA in effect at the time.

195)The crime of harassment, 11DE1311 states as a material element, “intent” to harass annoy or

alarm. Statement to DSP was Plaintiff called and did not include any allegation of language that

violates the statute.

196) Complainant said she had received “numerous” calls and texts prior to that day but DSP

made no attempt to verify the truth of that statement and never requested to see evidence of any

calls prior to obtaining the warrant because had they done so they would have found none.

197) Defendant DSP, presented allegations unsupported by physical evidence and purported to

magistrates reasonable suspicion either misrepresenting the extent that they verified the

information or the extent of efforts to determine probable cause that an offense has actually been


198) DSP presented warrant applications to magistrates for rubber stamp approval of the


199) DSP alleges that the officer who took the complaint on July 16, was not going to apply for a

warrant but was instructed to get a warrant by Defendant Fausey who stated that he “told”

Plaintiff not to call complainant.


200) The alleged statement of Defendant Fausey was a lie or intentional misrepresentation. Fausey

had advised Plaintiff, following an incident that did not involve Plaintiff June 30, that his ex-wife’s

family, where she lived, “did not want to hear from him anymore” and he was passing that along.

That occurred in the presence of a witness.

201) Had Fausey “told him” that he could no longer contact his ex-wife, it would not have been a

lawful order and it would have been unacceptable to the Plaintiff because Plaintiff and ex-wife

share joint custody and at the tender age of their children the only way for the Plaintiff to

communicate with his little boys was through their mother or other adult where they resided.

202) The warrant on July 16 fails the standard of “a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person’s belief that certain facts

are probably true”in the absence of proof of a single phone call or text message.

203) Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant on January 26, 2010

204) Defendant Lucas coerced a formal statement from Plaintiff’s ex-wife. She protested making

a formal statement and told Lucas that she did not want the Plaintiff arrested.

205) Lucas did not verify the Plaintiff’s voice on the voice mail, which he could personally

identify but only looked at the phone and saw an unidentified number called at 9:21AM.

206) Lucas had exculpatory evidence at his immediate disposal and did not have a totality of

information to apply for a warrant when the evidence that he had, literally in front of him, on

computer monitors showed the Plaintiff at 9:21 in the lobby and not on a phone.

207) Defendant Lucas refused Plaintiff’s request to view the video, of surveillance in his (Lucas’s)

possession, that would have exculpated Plaintiff from the allegation that he made a call at 9:21

208) A reasonable and cautious person would not believe it is reasonable that a call from a

restricted number came from the Plaintiff in light of the totality of circumstances; Plaintiff being in

the courthouse where cell phones are not allowed, being in the presence of Capitol Police and

numerous witnesses and Plaintiff recorded on video surveillance.

209) Defendant Lucas to have obtained a warrant for the arrest of Plaintiff (post arrest) either

misrepresented the facts, made material misstatements and/or omissions of material fact or was

awarded a rubber stamp warrant.


210) Plaintiff was arrested on August 13, 2010

211) Dover PD did not investigate prior to obtaining the warrant on August 12, 2010

212) Complainant(s) alleged Plaintiff followed person protected by PFA into a store and followed

her when she left.

213) Had Dover PD investigated prior to obtaining the warrant they would have observed

Plaintiff on video surveillance at the store, entering with a companion and waiting for his

companion to make a purchase and at Wilmington University approximately ten minutes after

leaving the store which did not leave time for him to be following the complainant as she alleged.

214) Dover PD failed to corroborate the allegation, didn’t contact the alleged perpetrator

(Plaintiff) in determining probable cause or take any action beyond taking a complaint and

obtaining a warrant based solely on that complaint.

215) Elements of the crime of stalking include “course of conduct” defined as three or more prior

incidents. Defendant Dover Police employee, Cpl. Ranger, used the arrests of Plaintiff on phone

harassment August 9 (that she incorrectly entered as “charged on July 16”) and breach of release

August 9, 2010 but did not list a third charge in the warrant application as required to establish

prior course of conduct on a charge of stalking, thus “stalking” was a false arrest on it’s face. The

state’s attorney’s office promptly reduced this charge prior to the first pre-trial hearing.

216) Dover PD failed to act in a timely manner to vacate the warrant of August 12, 2010 after

receiving a call from Major McQueen of DSP informing them that the same complainant was

being investigated for filing a false report against the same individual and one of the charges

material to the Dover PD charge was a false report.

217) Dover PD sent an email message to the Officer who obtained the warrant, Corporal Ranger,

to make further investigation but she was off that day and Dover PD took no other remedial

action, that day, to recall the warrant pending investigation prior to Plaintiff’s arrest.

218) Dover PD conducted a perfunctory investigation after the Plaintiff had been arrested to the

extent that they went to Walgreens and viewed the surveillance tape.


219) That Defendants DSP, Dover Police Department, Capitol Police, Fausey, Miller, Lucas,

failed or refused to conduct proper investigations in a professional and diligent fashion, absent a

threat of imminent danger or exigent circumstances and failed to take police action when it

became apparent that Plaintiff was the victim of a crime.

220) Had Defendants conducted a proper investigation, it would have shown the Plaintiff had an

albi and /or excuplating evidence.and was innocent of every criminal charge that was ever made

against him.

221) That Family Court, failed to institute the necessary safeguards to prevent citizens from

being falsely entered into DELJIS as having been served a PFA when they were not.

222) That as a direct and proximate cause of that failure, in paragraph 221, Plaintiff was falsely


223) That Defendant unknown employee(s) of Defendant Family Court entered Plaintiff into

DELJIS as having been served a PFA when he was not.

224) That as a direct and proximate cause of what is set forth in paragraphs 221 and 223 Plaintiff

was falsely arrested.

225) Defendants DSP, Capitol PD, Dover PD, Fausey, Miller, Lucass acted with reckless

indifference to cause arrests of Plaintiff Smith and he has suffered damage as a result.

226) That the Defendants DSP, Fausey, Miller, Dover PD, Capitol Police, Lucas, Unknown

Employee(s) of Family Court, owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff and breached the duty of care

owed to the Plaintiff.

227) That as a direct and proximate result of the breach of duty owed by Defendants DSP, Fausey

Miller. Capitol Police and Dover PD and Lucas, and Unknown Employee(s) of Family Court,

Plaintiff Smith has been damaged.



228) That Plaintiff realleges and as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous paragraph as

if set forth fully herein.

229) That Defendant DSP falsely imprisoned Plaintiff on January 14, 2010.


223) DSP did not immediately release the Plaintiff from custody when they learned he had not been

served the PFA

224) DSP took no action to secure the release of the Plaintiff from custody of DOC.

225) DOC continued the imprisonment of Plaintiff after they were notified by FC that the warrant

was bad and he should not have been arrested.

226) That Defendant unknown employee of Defendant FC entered Plaintiff into DELJIS as having

been served a PFA when he was not and was a proximate cause of false imprisonment and

wrongful detainment.

227) That Defendant DOC knew or should reasonably have known that Plaintiff’s bail had been

paid within minutes of him being turned over to their custody and failed to release him instead

falsely imprisoning him for a period of approximately twenty hours.

228) That Defendant DOC knew or should reasonably have known that Plaintiff had been falsely

arrested and failed to release him instead continuing his false imprisonment.

229) That unknown employees of Defendant DSP and Defendant Galloway were informed by

employee of Defendant FC that the Plaintiff had not been served the PFA and they continued

Plaintiff’s false imprisonment.

230) That unknown employees of Defendant DSP and Defendant Galloway knew that Plaintiff had

been falsely arrested and they turned him over to Defendant DOC with the intent to have his

unlawful detention continued in a state prison.

231) The Defendants named owed a duty to Plaintiff Smith not to falsely imprison him and breach

of that duty caused the Plaintiff damage.

232) If probable cause existed for arrest, on January 14. 2010, it ceased to exist to justify

Plaintiff’s continued detention and incarceration, when Defendants became aware that Plaintiff had

not been served the PFA

233) If probable cause existed for arrest on August 9, 2010 (warrant for criminal contempt

reduced to breach of release) it ceased to exist to justify Plaintiffs continued detention when

Defendants were shown the receipt factually disproving the allegations in the complaint and the

warrant application.


234) Defendants acted with reckless indifference or gross or wanton negligence

235) Defendants owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and as a direct and proximate result of the breach

of duty of care owed to Plaintiff the Plaintiff was damaged



236) That the Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

237) That the prosecutions of said criminal actions, in particular, for this count, the criminal

prosecutions of January 26, 2010, July 16, 2010 and August 9, 2010 and ended in favor of

Plaintiff Smith

238) That the charge of criminal contempt of the ex-parte protection order on August 9, 2010 was

reduced to breach of release (breach of release on the harassment charge at approximately 2:18PM

on the same day) upon production of receipts showing where Plaintiff actually was at the time

alleged in the complaint and in the warrant application.

239) Defendant Miller knew or should have known the information that he gave to the Magistrate

was false and knowingly gave false information or omitted material facts to institute a criminal

proceeding against the Plaintiff.

240) Defendant Miller acted in the face of knowledge that proved the Plaintiff had not committed

the crime as alleged by the complainant.

241) Defendant Lucas intentionally ignored evidence at hand that exculpated the Plaintiff.

242) Lucas arrested the Plaintiff prior to obtaining a warrant, falsely imprisoned him at the

courthouse and then knowingly gave false information or omitted material facts to a Magistrate

instituting a criminal proceeding against the Plaintiff

243) Defendant Fausey knew or should reasonably have known that he could not lawfully order

Plaintiff not to ever contact his ex-wife; the custodial parent of his minor children again as he

alleged to the DSP that obtained the warrant.

244) The DSP officer that obtained the warrant for the Plaintiff, on July 16, 2010 did so in a large


part because Fausey told him that Plaintiff had been told not to call her again. Fausey was a

proximate cause of the institution of the criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff.

245) Defendants Miller, Lucas and Fausey acted with malice and with gross or wanton negligence.

246) That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff has been damaged



247) That the Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein

248) Defendant Unknown employee of Kent County Family Court entered Plaintiff into DELJIS as

having been served the PFA in the absence of a return of service that showed the Plaintiff had in

fact been served.

249) Defendant unknown employee of Kent County Family Court did so knowing the Plaintiff had

not been served.

250) That action constitutes a false declaration of service.

251) Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing

252) Defendant knew it was reasonable to believe if not likely Plaintiff would call or otherwise

contact the protected Petitioner within the next two to four days that it customarily takes for such

service of process. and such contact would subject him to arrest on the false information he had

been served notice of a PFA

253) Defendant reasonably believed that Petitioner/recipient of the PFA, would file a police report

of any such contact and that a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest would issue and he would be falsely

arrested and falsely imprisoned.

254) Defendants’ actions were gross negligence

255) Defendants’ action was a substantial factor in Plaintiff’s arrest on January 14, 2010.


256) Defendant, an Unknown employee of Kent County Family Court, disclosed to Tiffany Smith

that she was a Respondent in a Petition for PFA that had been filed January 12, 2010 and advised

her to file a Petition for PFA against the Plaintiff who was the Petitioner in that PFA

257) Defendant that Unknown employee advising Ms. Smith to file for a PFA was advising her to

fabricate and/or lie in a sworn statement and/or under oath allegations of domestic abuse that were

intended to be granted the PFA

258) Defendants deliberately misused or perverted regularly issued court process not justified by

the underlying legal action.

259) Defendant’s action was the proximate cause of that Petition for PFA and the subsequent PFA

260) Defendants conduct was willful and wanton or reckless.

261) That as a direct and proximate result of Defendants actions, Plaintiff has been damaged.



262) Plaintiff alleges that Lucas willfully disregarded his own personal knowledge that Plaintiff was

in the building where phones are not allowed.

263) Plaintiff alleges that Lucas was motivated not by facts or evidence but by his interest in

developing a relationship with the complainant reflected by Lucas’s unwanted sexual

advances toward Plaintiff’s ex-wife.

264) Defendant unknown employee of Kent Family Court advised Plaintiff’s ex-wife that Plaintiff

had filed a Petition for a PFA and to cross file, as a legal tactic, acted inappropriately in an abuse

of power.

265) Defendants committed wrongful acts in their official capacity, in a willful manner such acts

causing harm to the Plaintiff

266) Plaintiff has been damaged as a proximate result of these acts





267) The Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporate by reference herein all previous paragraphs as

if set forth fully herein.

268) Plaintiff, suffered extreme emotional distress from being repeatedly falsely arrested and from

false imprisonments.

269) Plaintiff, is under constant fear from the threat of false arrest and false imprisonment because

of the policy and operating procedure of Defendant DSP, to not investigate complaints of criminal

acts by questioning him to ascertain if he has an alibi or information to contradict the allegations

and the fear that at any time a false report could be made against him and his first notice of it

would be his arrest.

270) Plaintiff suffered emotional harm when he was denied contact with his beloved sons because

of the statements, advise and custodial interference of Defendant Fausey, for a period of over five


271) Plaintiff was involuntarily injected with a foreign substance and subject to humiliating and

degrading treatment by Defendant DOC causing emotional harm.

272) Plaintiff’s personal safety was threatened while in custody of DOC

273) Plaintiff suffered emotional harm when Defendant Fausey failed to appear, under subpoena,

to testify which resulted in him being found guilty of civil contempt of a protection order which

resulted in adverse consequences and will result in further adverse collateral consequences in the

event of future allegations where it will enhance the penalty for civil convictions.

274) That Defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.

275) That Defendant’s conduct was intentional or reckless.

276) Defendants owed a duty of care not to inflict emotional harm

277) Defendants engaged in negligent conduct or willful violation of statutory standard.

278) Defendants’ negligent conduct or willful violation was a proximate cause of the serious

emotional distress.


279) Defendants’ conduct was intentional or reckless

280) Defendant’s conduct was extreme or outrageous conduct.

281) That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s intentional or negligent actions, Plaintiff

has been damaged.



282) That Plaintiff Smith realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

283) Defendant Delaware State Police, hereinafter DSP, failed to conduct an investigation in

determining probable cause and relied on the allegation of the complainant in making a decision to

obtain an arrest warrant charging Plaintiff Smith with the crime of harassment by phone, a


284) Had Defendant DSP investigated, paragraph 283, either by looking at the phone records of

the complainant or by interviewing Plaintiff would have known material statements made to them

were false.

285) Dover PD failed to secure Plaintiff’s personal property when he was arrested January, 2009

and transferred possession of the vehicle to the other party and his property, some which was

irreplaceable was lost or stolen

286) Vehicle was returned to Plaintiff approximately 16 months later, in deplorable condition, with

multiple mechanical problems, an additional 40,000 miles on the odometer, behind on car payments

and missing all of Plaintiff’s personal property.

287) Defendant Family Court failed to verify that Plaintiff had been served the PFA, January 13,


288) Defendant Lucas was negligent in failing to view the court video surveillance. January 26,


289) Defendant DOC was negligent in failing to secure the Plaintiff’s safety in their custody.

290) While in the custody of DOC Plaintiff was assaulted.


291) Defendant DOC was negligent in failing to immediately release Plaintiff when they knew that

he had been wrongfully arrested.

292) Defendant DSP was negligent in failing to conduct any investigation into the legitimacy of

complaints against Plaintiff

293) Defendant Galloway, transferred Plaintiff, to DOC at approximately 5PM August 9, 2010, by

which time he knew or should have known that Plaintiff had not been served the PFA and had been

wrongfully arrested.

294) Unknown employees of Defendant DSP were negligent in failing to release Plaintiff

immediately upon being informed that he had not been served the PFA and was wrongfully

arrested and also upon his proof that he and the woman he was allegedly with at his ex-wife’s

house with, were in Camden not Hartly at the time alleged he violated the PFA

295) Defendants had a duty of care.

296) Defendants breached that duty of care

297) As a proximate result of Defendants actions Plaintiff suffered damage.



298) The Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein, all the preceding

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

299) Defendants failed to do an action required by law to be performed OR

Defendants willfully neglected to perform duty or committed wilful misconduct without reasonable

cause or justification OR

Defendants committed unlawful act(s) that actor(s) had no legal right to do, done in ignorance,

inattention or malice, done in an official capacity

300) Defendant unknown employee of Family Court contacted Plaintiff’s ex-wife and

improperly disclosed he had filed PFA Petition.

301) Defendant unknown employee, of Family Court previous paragraph advised Plaintiff’s

ex-wife to cross file PFA Petition that day.


302) Defendant unknown employee of Family Court entered Plaintiff into DELJIS as having

been served PFA when that had not occurred.

303) Family Court did not secure Plaintiff’s release from incarceration when they learned he had

been falsely charged.

304) Lucas ignored/did not listen to voice mail allegedly from Plaintiff and refused to look at the

FC video.

305) That Defendant Miller changed the initial charge, criminal contempt of PFA to the charge of

breach of release, a the charge was a) false on it’s face; release 2:18PM complaint 1:02PM same

day b) failed to drop the charge when further proven false by post arrest investigation where

Fausey viewed video tapes, spoke to impartial witnesses at Taco Bell.

306) Defendants owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff and breached that duty of care.

307) Defendants’ breach of that duty of care was a proximate cause of damage to Plaintiff



308) The Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein, all the preceding

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

309) Commissioner granted relief to a Petitioner in a PFA that deprived Plaintiff of his vehicle that

was his only mode of transportation to his job in New Castle County and subsequently another

Commissioner did not rule on Plaintiff’s motion for return of his vehicle causing him to not only

lose his job but shortly thereafter his home. Defendant FC failed to train and or supervise or set

guidelines for Commissioners regarding conversion of Respondents’ property. This amounts to

false seizure of property but as the parties have absolute immunity the Family Court

Administrator or Chief Judge should properly train and supervise Commissioners to not unfairly

deprive citizens of property of monetary value.

310) Defendant Dover Police failed to properly train officers in procedures to secure property or

supervise to ensure that they secure property.


311) Justice of the Peace Court failed to properly train and supervise Magistrates in the application

of bail. JP Wood, an employee of JOP Court, exceeded SENTAC guidelines and failed to follow

JOP Court protocol to note in the file the reason that he did not set bail within SENTAC

guidelines. JP Sherlock did not consider the statement of the Dover Police Officer, Ritchie, who

stated that the charge was being investigated as a possible false report and that DSP was conducting

an investigation into a false report involving the same parties and Mr. Smith had turned himself in

mitigating the high bail Either and both of these factors should have been considered mitigating

factors in setting the amount of bail.

312) FC fails to train/supervise employees that they should not contact Respondents in Protection

Petitions and they should not give, what constitutes legal advice, advising Respondents to

cross file a Petition, as Defendant unknown employee of Family Court did with Plaintiff’s ex-wife.

313) FC failed to train supervise employees on procedure to ensure Respondents of PFA’s are not

entered as having been served until they have in fact been served.

314) FC failed to train supervise employees on proper handling of US mail/legal documents

315) DSP and Dover PD failed to train officers to recognize false allegations and to properly access

the credibility of witnesses or the reliability of their statements.

316) DSP officers ignored lawful subpoenas in flagrant violation of laws that they are sworn to

uphold demonstrating a failure on the part of DSP to properly train and/or supervise.

317) Defendants’ policy makers were aware of, and acquiesced in, a pattern of constitutional

violations involving the exercise of police discretion

318) Defendants DSP and Dover PD (unknown if it is also the policy of Defendant Capitol Police)

have a policy of mandatory arrest for complaints involving domestic violence this violates equal

protection interests by treating individuals who commit similar crimes differently based on whether

or not their crimes are classified as “domestic.”

319) Defendants rush to arrest, based on no investigation or on cursory investigations leads to the

arrests of innocent people.


320) When false complaints were made against Plaintiff to police agencies that don’t have

mandatory arrest policies, their officers conducted an investigation, did not find reasonable

suspicion Plaintiff had committed crimes alleged by complainant, and did not arrest Plaintiff.

321) Defendant DSP has a practice, an “unwritten” policy and trains its officers not to arrest women

who make false reports to police of allegations of crimes involving domestic violence or alleged

PFA violations.

322) Defendant Family Court, owed a duty of care to Plaintiff to ensure that he (and all citizens of

Delaware) was not wrongfully entered into the computer system as having been served a PFA

negligently or intentionally. As a direct and proximate result the Plaintiff has been damaged.

323) Defendant Family Court, owes a duty of care to Plaintiff to ensure that employees do not

contact or inform Respondents of pending Petitions for PFAs or other legal action has been initiated

except to effect lawful service of process.

342) Defendant Family Court owes a duty of care to Plaintiff (and all citizens of Delaware) to

ensure that employees do not encourage individuals to fabricate allegations (perjury pursuant to DE

Code 1221-2125) to obtain PFAs. themselves suborning perjury.

343) Defendant FC failed in and breached that duty and as a direct and proximate cause Plaintiff

was damaged.

344) Defendants DSP, Capitol Police, FC, DOC and Dover PD owe Plaintiff a duty of care, to

properly hire, train and supervise employees.

345) Defendants breached their duty of care and such breach was the proximate cause of

damage to Plaintiff.



346) Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous paragraphs as if

set forth fully herein.

347) That physically restraining Plaintiff as a part of false arrest and false imprisonment, was

intentional and offensive and constitutes the tort of assault.


348)That the humiliating and degrading treatment, intentional and offensive, by Defendant DOC

constitutes assault.

349) That the involuntary injection of a foreign substance, by Defendant DOC constitutes battery.

350) The Defendants owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff and breached that duty

351) Defendants breach of that duty caused damage to the Plaintiff.



352) Plaintiff realleges and as such, incorporates all previous paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

353) Plaintiff is unable to find a job befitting his education, experience and training

354) Plaintiff has been told by potential employers that it is because of his background check

355) Plaintiff’s background check shows no convictions but a pre-adjudication program and the

numerous arrests listed in this complaint that were nolle prossed.

356) Plaintiff at one time earned over fifty thousand dollars a year as a Corporate Undercover


357) Plaintiff at one time earned over forty thousand dollars a year in Retail Management

358) Plaintiff now earns nine dollars an hour, in a dangerous, unskilled, dirty, and physically

demanding factory job.

359) Plaintiff was offered a loss prevention job and had a start date at Walmart and the offer was

rescinded because of the background check.

360) Plaintiff was hired by Sonic as a manager trainee and the offer was rescinded based on his

background check.

361) As a result of Plaintiff’s car being taken in the ex-parte PFA in January 2009 and there being

no public transportation for him to be able to get back and forth to his job in New Castle County,

Plaintiff had to quit his job without proper notice and he is now permanently coded un-hireable for

any Sears or Kmart store.

362) The Defendants owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff and breached that duty.

363) Plaintiff has been damaged




364) The Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein, all the preceding

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

365) That Defendant Fausey, published statements to third party(s) that Plaintiff was guilty of

leaving a note at the residence of his ex-wife that threatened her and his beloved children, which

constitute crimes.

366) Defendant Fausey never questioned Plaintiff about note in question.

367) There was no evidence to support the statement of Fausey which was untrue. Plaintiff was not

in the state of Delaware at the time said note was delivered. Plaintiff has witnesses for where he was

the entire day the note was delivered and is on YouTube where he was speaking in DC at a national

event, that day.

368) Fausey published statements to third party(s) that Plaintiff was a suspect in a crime of assault.

369) Plaintiff did not commit the crime and was not charged for the crime.

370) Defendant Fausey herein caused to be communicated false and misleading statements,

allegations or information that he knew or should reasonably have known were false.

371) Fausey verbally published these statements with reckless disregard for the truth and did not act

reasonably to ascertain the truth of the statements before publishing them.

372) Fausey’s statements were relied on in testimony in Family Court for a Petitioner to apply for

and be granted a PFA.

373) Defendant Fausey owed a duty of care to Plaintiff not to disseminate false or misleading


374) Defendant Fausey breached that duty and as a proximate result the Plaintiff was damaged.

375) That the nature of the allegations, that Plaintiff committed crimes, is such that it is defamation

per se.




376) That Plaintiff Smith realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

377) That Plaintiff Smith had joint legal custody, and had every right to contact and parenting time

with his minor children, Gavin and Greyson Smith, then ages four and three.

378) That Defendant Fausey told Plaintiff’s ex-wife to not let Plaintiff have any contact with his

minor children.

379) That Defendant Fausey, represented that he was acting in an official capacity when he so

advised in the previous paragraph.

380) That Defendant Fausey, acted improperly interfering in the Plaintiff’s right to have contact

with his minor children.

381) That Defendant Fausey caused injury to the Plaintiff’s minor children, interfering with their

right to continuing the meaningful relationship they had with their father the Plaintiff as well as to

the Plaintiff.

382) That it was Defendant Fausey’s conscious intent to interfere with Plaintiff’s custody and/or

parenting time with his minor children.

383) That Defendant Fausey exceeded his authority as an employee of Defendant DSP.

384) That Defendant Fausey acted under the color of law

385) That Defendant DSP and Fausey, owed a duty not to interfere with Plaintiff Smith’s custody

and/or parenting time of his minor children and Fausey breached that duty of care.

386) Defendant Fausey told another officer at Troop 3 that he told Mr. Smith (Plaintiff) not to call

his ex-wife.

387) Defendant’s statement that Plaintiff shouldn’t call where his children lived was not lawful and it

was tortious interference with Plaintiff’s custody and/or parenting time.

387) Fausey has no legal right to interfere in the relationship with the Plaintiff and his minor



388) That Defendant DSP is responsible for the actions of it’s employees including Defendant


389) Defendant Fausey breached a duty of care and that as a proximate result of that breach

Plaintiff has been damaged.



390) Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous paragraphs as if

set forth fully herein

391) Plaintiff caused DSP officers Defendant Fausey and others to be lawfully served subpoenas to

appear and testify in Court

392) That Defendant Fausey failed to comply with a lawful subpoena signed by a clerk of the

court of the State of Delaware.

393) Failure to appear when commanded by subpoena is Contempt of Court

394) Fausey lied to his Superior Officer regarding his failure to comply with subpoenas

395) Plaintiff made a complaint to DSP which was investigated and found to be “substantiated”.

396) That other employees of DSP failed to comply with lawful subpoenas signed by a clerk of the

Family Court of the State of Delaware

397) That it is the policy of Defendant DSP that it’s employees comply with subpoenas and other

orders of the courts of the State of Delaware.

398) That such acts of the Defendant(s) obstruct and/or tend to impede the due administration of


399) Plaintiff suffered damages from the civil contempt in that the Commissioner would not allow

him to enter the police report into evidence, without testimony to its validity by DSP, the lack of

that evidence and other evidence that DSP officers and Defendant Fausey would have provided

caused Plaintiff to be found guilty of violating the PFA in that civil proceeding

400) Defendant Fausey had a duty to comply with a subpoena commanding him to testify as a

witness for the Plaintiff


401) Defendant Fausey breached that duty and as a proximate cause of that breach the Plaintiff was


402) Other employees that had been served subpoenas and failed to comply, had the same duty to

comply as Defendant Fausey. They also breached that duty.

403) DSP is responsible for it’s officers to comply with subpoenas and owed a duty of care to the

Plaintiff and breached that duty.

404) That as a direct result of the actions of the Defendants the Plaintiff has been damaged.



405) That the Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein, all preceding

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

406) Defendants Delaware State Police, Delaware Family Court, Delaware Department of

Corrections, Capitol Police and Dover Police Department employed the Defendants, Fausey, Miller,

Galloway, Lucas, Unknown employee of Kent Family Court, as well as unknown employees

referenced but not individually party to this lawsuit.

407) The above entity Defendants, DSP, FC, DOC, Capitol Police and Dover PD, are liable for the

actions of the other named defendants and unknown employees through the legal theories of

Respondeat Superior and vicarious liability.

408) The conduct of the other named defendants and unknown and/or unnamed employees, was

absent one or more of the elements of immunity as set forth in DE Code 4001.

409) Defendants DSP, Family Court, DOC, Capitol Police and Dover Police are liable for the

wrongful conduct of their employees as alleged in this Complaint.

410) Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of care and breached that duty and as a result the Plaintiff

was damaged




411) Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous paragraphs, as if

set forth fully herein:

412) That Plaintiff’s rights protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States particularly

but not limited to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eight, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, 42USC1986 the laws and Constitution of the State of

Delaware and otherwise were violated by the actions of the Defendants herein.

413) Defendants acted under the color of law.

414) Defendants are state actors

415) Plaintiff has a right guaranteed by the First Amendment to free speech that includes his right to

publicly criticize Defendants and conduct lawful public protest without fear of retribution or

retaliatory abuse of process by the Defendants.

416) In the Delaware Statute on Stalking; DE CODE 1312, the definition of course of conduct is

overly vague, and hence unconstitutional, specifically: “repeatedly means more than three

occasions.” It is unclear and vague to if it that means three prior arrests or an alleged victim states

something to the effect that “it’s happened three (or more) times before” particularly in light of “A

conviction is not required for any predicate act relied upon to establish a course of conduct” The

stalking charge against the Plaintiff was built on two previous unadjudicated false reports/false


417) Plaintiff had a fundamental interest in his children that is constitutionally protected that

Defendant Fausey interfered with.

418) Plaintiff was denied equal protection. Defendants, law enforcement officer(s) can be liable

under 1983 when by inaction they fail to perform a statutorily imposed duty to enforce the laws



419) As a result of the actions of Defendants, the Plaintiff remains in constant and ongoing jeopardy

of being wrongfully deprived of his civil liberties; to wit the refusal of the defendants to prosecute

individuals who they know or should reasonably know have made false reports to the police of

crimes with the domestic violence modifier or of violations of PFAs.

420) Additionally in conjunction with the Defendant police agencies practice of not confirming

existence of a crime or contacting accused to determine if there exists evidence to prove his

innocence, and the potential of excessive bail. Plaintiff is in danger of false imprisonment in the

future in Delaware.

421) The equal protection clause is applicable to discriminatory governmental action in

administration and enforcement of the law.

422) Plaintiff alleges excessive bail in that JP Wood failed to follow routine procedure or

SENTAC bail guidelines and set a bail that was excessive and unreasonable and meant to deprive

Plaintiff of his liberty, in violation of his rights under the Eight Amendment of the US Constitution

and the Constitution of the State of Delaware.

423) That JP Wood, an employee of JOP Court, set bail far in excess of SENTAC bail guidelines

on a charge of criminal contempt of PFA when there were no aggravating circumstances to even

justify bail at the higher limits of the guidelines

424) It is unconstitutional to set a bail higher, in an allegation of domestic violence than in the

same level of charge , misdemeanor A, that doesn’t involve a protected party. Bail is set to afford

accused, presumed innocent, to remain free. The interest of the state in every case is to set bail to

reasonably ensure the accused appears in court and is not a danger to the community.

425) false arrest on January 14, 2010, January 26, 2010, August 9, 2010, August 13, 2010

excessive bail January 14, 2010 was in violation of Plaintiffs civil rights.

426) Plaintiff alleges false imprisonment/unlawful detention January 14, 2010, January 26, 2010

and August 9, 2010, in violation of his civil rights.


427) It was the custom for Defendants DSP, and Dover PD (in the arrest of 8/13/10) not to

investigate a complaint beyond the verbal allegations of the complainant(s). Specifically, DSP and

Dover PD have a policy of “mandatory arrest” in cases involving an allegation of domestic

violence that exceeds the Delaware Code which is pro arrest.

428) This policy encourages officers to lower the bar on “probable cause” to the injury of accused,

in this case the Plaintiff.

429) Additionally, when an application for a warrant is presented to a Magistrate, there is no

evidence to support that the Magistrates are aware of any difference in the level of investigation

the officer has made being less for warrants involving the modifier of domestic violence.

Magistrates are unaware that material facts have not been investigated.

430) For Defendants to make false statements, material misrepresentations or omissions or

intentionally mislead a Magistrate to obtain a warrant is reckless indifference to the Plaintiff’s rights

and acting under color of law.

431) For Magistrates to grant warrants without sufficient inquiry and themselves determining that

probable cause is met is a clear violation of Fourth Amendment rights.

432) Defendants DSP and Lucas failed to meet the standard set by the courts of probability based

on “totality of the circumstances” by the willful and wanton disregard of evidence that they had at

their disposal.

433) Defendant DSP did not ask the complainant to show evidence of excessive phone calls in her

allegation of harassment by phone January, 2009 or any proof that she, as alleged, told the

Plaintiff “weeks ago” not to call. Had DSP looked at her phone they would have seen the number of

missed or unanswered calls, from the Plaintiff’s phone number, to be far less than she stated and

they would have seen calls the previous days that complainant had called Plaintiff numerous

times and answered his calls numerous times and that in the weeks she alleged that she

had told Plaintiff not to call they were having consensual communication, thus contradicting her

allegation against the Plaintiff.


434) Plaintiff alleges that if DSP had investigated by looking at complainant’s phone for

corroborating evidence they would have reasonably concluded that Plaintiff was not likely or

probably to have committed a criminal act.

435) Plaintiff alleges that DSP would have required corroborating evidence had the charge of

harassment not been against an estranged spouse, bringing the domestic violence issue into play.

436) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant DSP would have investigated the allegations on January 13,

2010 further had it not involved “domestic violence”

437) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant DSP disregarded the “totality of evidence” when they did not

ask for or attempt to find corroborating evidence to support complaint(s) allegations or question the


438) Plaintiff alleges that in allegations of criminal contempt an element of the crime is

“knowingly” and the legislative intent was not the arrest of individuals who inadvertently come

upon protected individuals in a public place.

439) Plaintiff alleges that the verbal allegations of a violation of a PFA, to DSP did not constitute

probable cause and the custom of DSP was to automatically apply for a warrant against the

Plaintiff in reckless disregard for his civil rights.

440) DSP denied Plaintiff equal protection due to malperformance of official duties.

441) In addition Plaintiff alleges that in the effort to address domestic violence, against women, the

DSP now tramples on the civil rights of men as a class.

442) That mandatory arrest policies are in practice construed to violate due process for the Plaintiff

and men as a class.

443) Probable cause is defined as “a reasonable ground for suspicion or belief, supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonably cautious and prudent

person in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.”

444) The standard applied in. Plaintiff’s arrests resembles ‘some credible evidence’ which is

constitutionally insufficient.


445) The testimony of more than one witness, which is corroborated in some aspects by physical

evidence, may create probable cause. See Brown v.Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2001).

446) DSP did not require aspects of physical evidence or testimony of more than one witness prior

to warrant applications in several instances.

447) Plaintiff was accused by same complainant of crimes in other jurisdictions where the police

agencies conducted proper investigation, looked for physical evidence to support allegations and

spoke to Plaintiff/suspect and no warrant applications were made.

448) Defendants knew or should have known that the allegations were false.

449) “Police manuals typically give the impression that police officers who are experienced in

interviewing suspects are good lie detectors (Inbau, Reid, Buckley and Jayne, 1986,

2001).“Detecting True Lies: Police Officers’Ability to Detect Lies,” (Journal of Applied

Psychology, 2004) demonstrated that these claims are true” Police generally through training and

experience have a demonstrated ability to detect deception that has an accuracy rate of 85.4%

according to the research paper entitled, “Strategic Use of Evidence During Police Interviews:

When Training to Detect Deception Works,” (Law and Human Behavior, 2006). The failure of

Defendants DSP, Dover Police, Fausey, and Miller to detect deception on the part of the

complaining witness were not be coincidence. It is a reflection of the policy of DSP of mandatory

arrest and bias against men as a class.

450) DSP, Capitol Police, Dover Police, used a different standard of proof in determining probable

cause in making decisions on obtaining warrants for the Plaintiff that they use had the parties in the

situation been reversed and it be a man accusing a woman of a crime of domestic violence.

451) Such policies are discriminatory and denied the Plaintiff the rights he should enjoy and would

enjoy if he was a woman.

452) The common practice of the DSP has gone from the practice, some twenty years ago, where

a woman had less protection from the police if the allegation involved someone with whom she had

a domestic relationship to where a man has less protection from the police if an allegation involves

someone with whom he does or did have a domestic relationship.


453) DSP denied Plaintiff equal protection when after conducting proper investigation, and finding

physical evidence including video and electronic evidence as opposed to the standard they applied

to Plaintiff of she said it so we take her word for it; Defendant DSP failed to arrest the

individual(s) who perpetrated the crime of false report to the police, 11DE1245.

454) That as a result of being denied equal protection the Plaintiff has suffered grievous harm, false

arrest, wrongful detainment and incarceration, and is in danger in the future of being the victim of

the crime again.

455) Plaintiff realleges specifically the allegations in paragraphs 317, 318, and 319.

456) Plaintiff was not guilty of any of the charges brought against him. In the first charge,

harassment by phone he had been in frequent consensual communication with his estranged wife

and has phone records to support this and to refute the allegation she made to the DSP that she

told him to stop calling weeks before. Complainant became angry with him and didn’t take his

calls. Plaintiff didn’t know she was mad and called becoming increasingly concerned that she had a

problem with her severe asthma or something had happened to his 1 and 2 year old sons. Messages

left on her voice mail support this contention. . After the false report the estranged wife made in a

moment of anger she tried to recant her statement to the DAG and because of the no-drop policy

they would not let her drop the charges. The Plaintiff in poor judgment took a PBJ not knowing or

being told that he could get a jury trial in Superior Court. Plaintiff went through legal steps to

withdraw his plea. Plaintiff’s now ex-wife wrote a sworn statement recanting her charge. Plaintiff

alleges that if a person with whom he was not married to or classified under the Delaware definition

of domestic had made the same allegation with the same set of facts no finding or probable cause

would have been made and no warrant applied for.

457) Plaintiff re-assets that in the subsequent arrests, further investigation would have been made

had the complaint not come from a former spouse and no probable cause would have been found,

no warrant application and no arrest.


458) Plaintiff alleges that if a non-related person made a false report to the police, that resulted in

his arrest and evidence showed that material facts were false he would be able to press charges for

11DE1245 and the perpetrator would be arrested.

459) Plaintiff alleges that with a complaint that is classified domestic complainants give defacto

immunity to individuals, predominantly women who make false reports.

460) Dover PD has the same common practice and is still liable to Plaintiff for equal protection

461) DSP failed to enforce the law equally and fairly in a pattern that discriminates against men.

462) Dover PD failed to enforce the law equally and fairly in a pattern that discriminates against


463) Plaintiff’s incarceration exposed him to harm.

464) Plaintiff suffered harm as a result of his incarceration

465) Plaintiff’s involuntary injection with a foreign substance violated the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act

466) Defendant’s acted with reckless indifference.

467) Defendant DSP was not interested in truth and wanted speedy arrest on allegation of

domestic violence.

468)That pursuant to Section 1983 of the Federal Code and other sections and pursuant to laws and

regulations as adopted by the State of Delaware, the Defendants DSP, Dover PD, Family Court,

DOC, governmental entities herein and their unknown employees, and Defendants Lucas, Miller,

Fausey Galloway owed a duty of care to Plaintiff Smith not to injure him in an action at law, suit in

equity or other procedure.

469) That said duty is secured by the United States Constitution and Delaware State Constitutions,

as well as laws of the State of Delaware.

470) That Defendants breached that duty and as a result Plaintiff has been damaged.




471) That the Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporates by reference herein all previous

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

472) That Defendants conduct was intentional, negligent or reckless in nature.

473) That the Defendant caused Plaintiff serious harm, including but not limited to include his

wrongful incarceration and as such deprivation of his freedom and liberty.

474) That, in addition, Defendant DSP failed and continues to fail to protect Plaintiff from false

police reports, a crime, by demonstrating to a particular complainant that her false reports will not

be punished.

475) That as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and conduct the Plaintiff has

been damaged.

476) That due to the outrageous nature of the actions of the Defendants, they should be assessed

punitive damages.



477) That the Plaintiff realleges and, as such, incorporate by reference herein all previous

paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

478) That due to the nature of negligence and the intentional acts of the Defendants they should be

responsible to pay any and all bond fees, court costs, attorneys fees and all expenses related to this

action incurred by the Plaintiffs.



479) That the Plaintiff realleges and as such incorporates by reference herein all paragraphs as set

fort fully herein.


480) That the Plaintiff request specific other relief, by order of the court to wit:

481)That Defendant DSP, and Dover PD change it’s policy and procedure of mandatory arrest in

allegations of domestic related crimes to the statutory language of pro-arrest.

ii) That Defendant DSP, change it’s policy and procedure to reaffirm that individuals accused by

statement of crimes of domestic violence are presumed innocent and entitled to investigation to

determine probable cause as when accused of other crimes.

iii) That Defendant DSP and Defendant Dover PD, institute policy and procedure that in the

absence of the threat of physical violence they will attempt to contact an individual accused of a

crime of domestic violence as part of an investigation into probable cause prior to obtaining an

arrest warrant and endeavor to find physical evidence to support allegations of a crime.

iv) That Plaintiff’s drivers license be restored.

v) That Defendant DSP investigate complaints of false police report diligently and arrest

individuals who have filed false police reports as a matter of good public policy and in

accordance with the legislative intent of 11DE 1245 to hold people accountable for the

crime therein.

vi) That Defendant Family Court institute safeguards to prevent citizens from being wrongfully

entered into DELJIS by Family Court employees.

vii) That Defendant Family Court train employees not to divulge the filing of Petitions for PFAs to

Respondents outside lawful service of process of PFAs and train employees not to encourage

perjury in PFA applications.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, respectfully moves this Court for judgment as follows:

A) For this court to find for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant(s).

B) For this court to award monetary damages and other relief, to the Plaintiff and against

the Defendants.

i) Monetary Judgment in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact (this case a jury)

ii) For damages incurred related to the physical and emotional injuries sustained by the Plaintiff


iii) For damages incurred for the treatment of such injuries.

iv) For loss of earning capacity

v) For loss of earnings

vi) For pain and suffering incurred by Plaintiff

vii) For damages related to the wrongful arrests, bond and incarceration of the Plaintiff, including

loss of liberty.

viii) For exemplary (punitive) damages for the intentional wrongful conduct of the Defendant(s).

ix) For any and all other damages that may be proven during the course of this action, including

other non-named direct, indirect and/or consequential damages.

x) For the award of attorney’s fees and costs.

xi) For the specific other relief.

C. That due to the ongoing and continuing nature of the Defendants wrongful conduct the

Plaintiff be allowed leave to amend this complaint to include future false and misleading allegations

and their consequences in this Complaint up to the time the matter is adjudicated.


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